The End of the End of History

by Devilstower [courtesy of Daily Kos]

In 1992, Francis Fukuyama rang the memorial bells for history itself.

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

The idea was that the previous two centuries had been a contest -- a proving ground -- on which different forms of government from hereditary monarchy to Marxist communism had been tested. In these contests, western democracy had proven itself the most resilient and formidable of systems. With the crumbling of the Soviet empire, the superiority of our democratic system would bring about the twilight of the struggles that filled the pages of military and political tomes, leading to a quiet twilight filled with fancy sneakers and iPods.

It was a comforting thought, but critics at the time were quick to point out that Fukuyama seemed to have assumed a limitless system, unbounded by conflicts brought on by environmental or economic limits on growth. On the conservative side, many latched onto the idea that not only would democracy win out, but that we could speed along the process. After all, nothing says democracy like bombing people then smearing their fingers with ink.

It would be unfair to Fukuyama to suggest that he thought his "end of history" meant an endless era of brotherhood, peace, and mass singings of Kumbaya. That's not the end of history, that's the end of human nature. The idea that democracies won't clash, or that there won't be conflict over resources, is too silly to take seriously.

Fukuyama's view of human nature is a high-minded one, drawing equally from Hegel and Alan Bloom. It's an argument for the human spirit, an assertion of an innate desires for freedom. It's almost as if there were an ideal form of government that suits humankind, just as there was a world of perfect objects casting their shadow in Plato's cave. In a lot of ways, it's a satisfying argument -- especially for those who happen to have been born in a western democracy.

In The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama acknowledges that democracy has been, and probably will be, tied to the marketplace. It's hard to imagine a country that says everyone has the freedom to cast their vote for any candidate they chose, but also says people have no right to property (if for no other reason that that such a government is unlikely to withstand it's first free election). But the book doesn't acknowledge the extent to which the success of democracies can be limited by their dependence on the market. It also doesn't mention what in 1992 was something we were only beginning to remember: the extent to which the market can reward the very kind of dictatorship that Fukuyama expected to perish.

Finally, it didn't account for the all the ways in which western democracy was dependent on the actions of existing western democracies. History is replete with ideas that in retrospect were terrific ideas, but which weren't accepted because the person or organization presenting the idea was seen as unacceptable. The British Navy was still losing thousands of sailors to scurvy decades after experiments had shown how to prevent the problem, because those who had the solution lacked the political power to put the solution into general practice. There's a lot to like the Quaker message about the sanctity of each individual, but if the only Quaker you knew was Dick NixWithout the right messenger, even the best idea can be crippled.

In the most recent issue of Newsweek, Fukuyama is back to tell us that we screwed it up.

Ideas are one of our most important exports, and two fundamentally American ideas have dominated global thinking since the early 1980s, when Ronald Reagan was elected president. The first was a certain vision of capitalism—one that argued low taxes, light regulation and a pared-back government would be the engine for economic growth. ...

The second big idea was America as a promoter of liberal democracy around the world, which was seen as the best path to a more prosperous and open international order. ...

It's hard to fathom just how badly these signature features of the American brand have been discredited.

Not only has the shocking behavior of the HMS. Titanic American economy discredited the principles of Reaganism around the world, democracy itself has taken a hit. Mostly because we took what's perhaps the most uplifting idea of all time and weaponized it.

Democracy was tarnished even earlier. Once Saddam was proved not to have WMD, the Bush administration sought to justify the Iraq War by linking it to a broader "freedom agenda"; suddenly the promotion of democracy was a chief weapon in the war against terrorism. To many people around the world, America's rhetoric about democracy sounds a lot like an excuse for furthering U.S. hegemony.

While we may not (yet) have bloodied democracy's nose to the extent that we've reversed the trend toward more democratic governments around the world, we've certainly slowed down the process. And the rise of dictatorial capitalism in nations like China shows that there are still new entries into the no-holds-barred contest of political systems.

History is apparently not all that dead. But Reaganism is. And we can only hope that the spread of democracy will not be too badly damaged by democracy's chief salesman, whose hardball tactics have turned off customers around the world.